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crossing a track obscured by temporary smoke and steam.'13 Such
a decision might be unable to withstand analytical scrutiny under
prevailing Ohio law. If a passenger expressly assumes the driver's
duty to listen for the approach of trains, the passenger then has
the same duty as would a driver insofar as there has been an as-
sumption of duty.136
Finally, it must be well remembered that the legal principles
and standards pertinent to passengers are not inflexible; they have
been enunciated by the judiciary in such a manner that if the facts
so require they are capable of great breadth and elasticity.
Earl E. Mayer, Jr.
CivIL PRoCEDURE - ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT - NEGLIGENCE IN
PROPERTY DAMAGE AND PERSONAL INJURY
Plaintiff brought a negligence action for personal injuries
against defendants (master and servant) arising from an inter-
section collision. The defendants' answers contained allegations of
general denial, contributory negligence, and the affirmative de-
fense of res judicata in that the present plaintiff had been ad-
judged negligent in a previous action. The plaintiff's reply in re-
gard to the new matter of res judicata was that the suit referred
to by the defendants had been a suit for property damages only
and was therefore not res judicata in the present action. The lower
courts ruled for the plaintiff. On appeal, held reversed. The princi-
ple of estoppel by judgment precluded the plaintiff from recovering
in the instant case. Mansker v. Dealers Transport Co., 160 Ohio St.
255, 116 N.E. 2d 3 (1953).
The lower courts, in holding that the previous suit for property
damages was not binding in the present suit, had relied on language
in Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 337, 61 N.E. 2d 707, 716
(1945), which stated that "(a) n act of a defendant which might
not be regarded as an unreasonable risk as to plaintiff's property,
might well be considered an unreasonable risk as to his person."
The reversal of the lower courts' decisions in the principle case
makes it clear that the above quoted language in Vasu v. Kohlers,
Inc., supra, will not prevent the application of the principle of
estoppel by judgment to ordinary negligence actions such as the
principal case. The Supreme Court stated in the principal case at
160 Ohio St. 259, 116 N.E. 2d 6, "The fact that in the former case
damage to property was involved whereas in the present case injury
to the person is the subject of the action makes no difference; the
standards by which negligence is determined are the same :in both
instances."
13S Williams v. Railway Co., 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. (1917).
136Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra.
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The language quoted previously in Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., supra,
was used in that case to support the holding that injuries to plain-
tiff's property and person constitute two separate causes of action
even though both result from the same negligent act of the de-
fendant. This position, which is held by only a minority of the
states, is followed in the principal case. A leading case supporting
the minority view is Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170
N.Y. 40, 62 N.E. 772 (1902). See Note, 32 YALE L.J. 190 (1922);
64 A.L.R. 670 (1929); 52 Am. JuR. TORTS § 108 (1944); CiARK,
CoDE PLEammnG 488 (2d ed. 1947). Persuasive authority for the
language of Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., supra, that there may be two
tests of negligence can be found in the Restatement Of Torts, which
in considering the factors that determine the magnitude of the risk
in negligence actions, states, "As the social value of the interest
imperiled increases, the magnitude of the risk which is justified
diminishes. Conduct which would create an unreasonable risk of
harm to life or limb might be justified if only some property in-
terest of merely dignitary or slight tangible value were imperiled."
RSTATE MENr, TORTS § 293, comment a (1934).
It is difficult, however, to conceive of an actual negligence ac-
tion involving injuries to both property and person where a differ-
ent test would be applied in each cause of action to determine
whether a party was negligent. If such an unlikely situation should
arise, logic probably would require that the determination of negli-
gence in a property damage action would not be conclusive as to
negligence in a personal injury action.
The statement in the principal case is applicable to the great
majority of negligence actions in which injuries to both property
and person are involved. The test for negligence is normally the
same with respect to both property damage and personal injury,
and a determination of negligence in an action on one cause of
action will be conclusive in an action on the other cause of action.
An example is Fleischer v. Detroit Cadillac Motor Car Co., 165
N.Y. Supp. 245 (1917), where the plaintiff had previously re-
covered a property damage judgment and then had brought an
action for personal injuries arising from the same collision. The
court stated at page 246, "(The property) judgment is therefore
res adjudicata as to the negligence of the defendant."
It is significant that some courts in other jurisdictions have
applied the principle of estoppel by judgment or collateral estoppel
when one cause of action involved property damage and the other
involved personal injury without even mentioning the possiblity
of there being two different tests of negligence. House v. Benton,
42 Ga. App. 97, 155 S.E. 47 (1930); Pratt v. Vaughan et al., 2 Cal.
App. 2d 722, 38 P. 2d 799 (1934); Winters v. Bisaillon, 153 Ore.
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509, 57 P. 2d 1095 (1936). Likewise, the Restatement Of Judgments
does not indicate that it recognizes two different tests of negli-
gence when under the minority view two causes of action have
arisen from a single negligent act. According to the Restatement
Of Judgments, if plaintiff brings a negligence action for personal
injuries, "... and after a trial there is a verdict and judgment for
the defendant, and the plaintiff later brings an action for the damage
to his property, the prior judgment is conclusive if the same'issues
are raised." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68, comment c (1942). See
also Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HAtv. L. R. 1
(1942).
The result reached in the principal case is logical and desirable
and is in accord with the cases in other jurisdictions. A contrary
holding would have limited seriously the application of the principle
of estoppel by judgment to negligence actions, and would have
thereby permitted undersirable re-litigation of the question of neg-
ligence.
Charles R. Leech, "Jr.
CRnIMNAL LAW - ASSAULT Arm BATTERY - LnmTs Or PAmmTS' AND
TEAcHERs' AtUTHOR= TO INFICT ConRPOP.L PuNIsHmEr
Defendant school principal had good reason to believe an
eleven year old pupil while on the way to school had thrown a
stone at one of his schoolmates, knocking off her glasses. Relying
on this belief defendant spanked the boy with a wooden paddle.
The child was an epileptic and his mother testified that after the
spanking he had several fits. Defendant was found guilty of as-
sault and battery in municipal court. On appeal to the Court of
Common Pleas, held, reversed. Although a parent is criminally
responsible for immoderate punishment inflicted on his child re-
gardless of motive or malice, mere excessive punishment on the
part of a teacher is not sufficient to attach criminal liability in the
absence of a showing of malice or that some permanent injury has
been inflicted. State v. Lutz, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 402, 113 N.E. 2d 757
(1953).
Defendants in this sort of case appear to fall into two categories
-parents and those in loco parentis (teachers falling within the
latter category). There are also two views on what is needed to es-
tablish criminal liability- the one, holding the defendant re-
sponsible merely for immoderation in administering punishment,
and the other, requiring either a lasting injury or that the im-
moderate punishment be accompanied by malice to attach liability.
On the basis of these distinctions it is possible to make four com-
binations of types of defendant and tests of liability and authority
can be cited for each one.
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The one approach refuses to distinguish between the parent
and one in loco parentis and holds both liable if they inflict ex-
cessive punishment even though they act in good faith, Carpenter
v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E. 2d 419 (1947) and this is
the majority view. Carpenter v. Commonweath, supra; Note, 5 So.
CALIF. L. REv. 173 (1931); Note, 34 VA. L. REV. 247 (1948); See
Note, 43 A.L.R. 507.
In this connection, the question of whether the teacher's action
constituted excessive or immoderate punishment in a given in-
stance is said to be one for the jury, to be determined from all the
attending circumstances - the age, size and general conduct of the
child, the nature of the particular misconduct, the instrument used
for punishment, and the wounds which have been inflicted. Car-
penter v. Commonwealth, supra. One may again treat both types of
defendant identically and not hold either one responsible for an
error of judgment, investing both with quasi-judicial powers and
limiting criminality to cases where there is malice or permanent
injury. State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 31 Am. Dec. 416 (1837);
Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268 (1889).
If different tests are applied to parent and teacher, it is pos-
sible as in the principal case, to hold the parent to a stricter stand-
ard, but impose liability on the teacher only if there is malice or
a lasting injury. Holmes v. State, 39 So. 569 (Ala. 1905). It is equal-
ly possible to take exactly the opposite view, as expressed in
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859), where the
stricter standard is applied to the teacher. Surprisingly, the Lander
case is cited in the principal case as supporting the rule there ap-
plied, but possibly this is because the Lander case also holds that
there is a strong presumption in favor of the correctness of the
teacher's actions, especially if he acted in good faith and without
malice.
The rationalizations offered for allowing either parent or
teacher greater leeway in enforcing discipline are rather startling
and contradictory. On the one hand, it is suggested that the par-
ent's love for his child makes it safe to allow him a greater author-
ity. "The parental power is little liable to abuse, for it is continual-
ly restrained by natural affection, the tenderness which the parent
feels for his offspring, an affection ever on the alert and acting
rather by instinct than reasoning."
"The schoolmaster has no such natural restraint. Hence he
may not safely be trusted with all a parent's authority, for he
does not act from the instinct of parental affection." Lander v.
Seaver, supra.
On the other hand, it is said that the teacher is more impartial
than the parent. The principal case points out that while a parent
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may punish a child for the ilwill he bears another member of the
family, a school teacher rarely punishes one pupil for the misdeeds
of another: "The quasi-judicial capacity of the school teacher
punisher is therefore more impersonal and impartial than that of
a parent or step-parent punisher."
And in justifying allowing a teacher as great a power as is
granted the parent, one case says: "The character and interest of
the teacher, combined with the refinement which education gives
to the human mind in softening the heart, like parental love, is
generally found a sufficient protection for the children." Common-
wealth v. Seed, 5 Clark 78 (Pa. 1859).
One of the main arguments against adopting a more liberal
attitude toward the teacher's behavior than to the parent's is based
upon a theory as to the source of the teacher's power. Some courts
regard the teacher's authority as a delegation of the parent's power
to use corporal punishment to discipline his child. State v. Pender-
grass, supra. If this is the only source of the teacher's authority,
it is argued that the parent can delegate no greater power to the
teacher than he himself has. 1 BisHOP, CRnMNAL LAw § 886 (9th ed.
1923). This theory of the source of the teacher's authority is un-
satisfactory in that a delegation implies consent and if school at-
tendance is compulsory the delegation, in the individual case, may
not be voluntary. See comment, 26 ILL. L. REv. 815 (1932).
The other basis of the teacher's power to inflict corporal
punishment is the theory that it is necessary to grant him this
power in order to maintain discipline in the school and some cases
adopt this justification. Dodd v. State, 94 Ark 297, 126 S.W. 834
(1910). Under this theory there need be no correspondence between
the teacher's and the parent's authority.
Ohio, although adopting, in the principal case, the view that
the teacher stands in loco parentis to his pupils, apparently regards
the teacher as a special member of the class. Only in the teacher-
pupil cases is lasting injury or malice demanded as a condition to
liability. Martin v. State, 11 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 183 (1910), aff'd
without opinion, 87 Ohio St. 459, 102 N.E. 1132 (1912). Parents and
step-parents alike are liable for immoderation in punishing regard-
less of malice. State v. Liggett, 84 Ohio App. 225, 83 N.E. 2d 663
(1948); Mohr v. State, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct., N.S., 43 (1908).
The two different tests of liability, which have been so labored
over, lead to much the same result in any particular instance. In
the cases applying the strict test (no liability for excessive punish-
ment in the absence of malice or permanent injury), malice is often
implied from the excessiveness of the punishment, State v. Koonse,
123 Mo. App. 655, 101 S. W. 139 (1907). In those applying the more
liberal test, there is frequently a strong presumption in favor of
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the correctness of the punisher's actions, especially in the absence
of malice. Lander v. Seaver, supra. As a result, the difference be-
tween the two views is not particularly striking.
As long as the teacher is given the privilege to inflict corporal
punishment, the limits of his authority must be defined. To the
extent that the choice between the rule which imposes liability
only where malice or lasting injury is involved and the rule which
holds a teacher liable for immoderate punishment without regard
to these two factors is of any importance, it seems more reasonable
and less involved to hold both parent and teacher liable for ex-
cessive punishment and leave it to the jury to determine in any
particular case whether the punishment was unnecessary or un-
reasonable in degree. The desire to refrain from interfering with
the family relation and undermining the parent's authority, which
operated in so many of the earlier parent-child cases, State v.
Koonse, supra; Commonwealth v. Seed, supra, is no longer the
overriding concern it once was in our society. The concept of a
class of excessive and immoderate punishments for which criminal
liability cannot attach because they were not maliciously inflicted
and no permanent injury was produced is not consonant with
modern views, unless "excessive" and "immoderate" are to take
on new and much more colorless meanings.
It may well be that in future years, if current trends con-
tinue, the privilege at least for teachers will be entirely abolished.
Corporal punishment of any sort is considered by some authorities
to be out of line with modern theories of education. Falk, CORPORAL
PuNmmrmr 139 (1st ed. 1942). It is thought to be appropriate
to an authoritarian system and not consistent with our democratic
ideas. Ibid.; SBEm-Amov AND REDL, Discn-imqE FOR TODAY'S CHmAEN
Aim YoUTH 8-10 (1st ed. 1944). It is further attacked because it may
cause resentment and fear in the child- attitudes clearly not
conducive to learning. ScEuurn, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AD3uSTMENT
176 (1st ed. 1936); COLE Am MORGAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILD-
HOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 143 (1st ed. 1947).
There has been a considerable decrease in recent years in the
severity of corporal punishment applied in schools and the fre-
quency with which it is used. FALx, op. cit. supra, at 124. However,
corporal punishment is far from being abolished in the schools,
FMJx op. cit. supra, at 124. Only in one state has it been abolished
by statute-New Jersey. N. J. ST. ANN. tit. 18, c. 19-1 (1903);
REm.LEun, SCHOOL LAW 232 (1st ed. 1950). A few communities
have forbidden it by school board regulation. Bd. of Ed. City of
N.Y. §90 (15). Although violation of these regulations might lead
to a teacher's dismissal, the regulations would probably not cause
a stricter rule to be applied in a criminal prosecution than was
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already in effect in the courts of that jurisdiction. Mansell v.
Griffin, [1908] 1 K.B. 947; Note, 1 SYRACUSE L.J. 252. In communi-
ties where these regulations are in force or where there is a tacit
understanding that corporal punishment is prohibited, the assump-
tion is apparently that the problem of brutal or sadistic teachers
can best be handled on an administrative level and that criminal
prosecution should be reserved as a last-line of defense in extreme
cases.
Marian L. Griffin
EVMNCE - PHYSICIAN-PATmNrT PEIVIEGE - NoT
APPLICABLE TO DEATH CERTmcATE
Plaintiff claimed death benefits under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act for the death of her husband. The Industrial Commission
disallowed the claim on the ground that the death was not in the
course of and arising out of employment. Plaintiff appealed to the
court of common pleas and had a verdict and judgment which was
affirmed by the court of appeals. Defendant claimed the trial court
erred in refusing to admit in evidence the official death certificate
signed by decedent's attending physician on the ground that it
was a privileged communication within Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02
whereby a physician is not permitted to testify in certain respects
concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that
relation, or his advice to his patient. Defendant claims the certifi-
cate should be admissible under Ohio Rev. Code § 3705.05 which
states that a certificate of any death "shall be prima facie evidence
in all courts and places of the facts therein stated." Held, reversed,
and a new trial ordered. The death certificate was admissible as
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The statute re-
lating to death certificates is the more recent and since the latter
is more "specific" while the older statute is merely general, the
specific and more recent enactment must prevail. Perry v. Indus-
trial Commission, 160 Ohio St. 520, 117 N.E.2d 34 (1954).
The authorities differ widely on the admissibility of death
certificates, such differences arising in part from the state of the
statutory law, the nature of the certificate offered, the difference
in the factual situation and the fact or matter on which it is offered.
See notes, 17 A.L.R. 359 (1922), 42 A.L.R. 1454 (1926), 96 A.L.R.
324 (1935); 46 C.J.S. INSURANCE § 1337 n. 2; 32 C.J.S. EvmENcE §
638b; 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § § 1644, 1646 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1953);
8 WiGcioPE § 2385a.
The physician-patient privilege did not exist at common law
and hence is a purely statutory device. However, some writers hold
that records of births, deaths and marriages, when properly kept
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as required by law, have been recognized both in the civil and
common law as public records, and, as such, were admissible in
evidence for certain purposes. They feel that the requirement of
a death certificate comes directly within the police power of the
state and is consequently under legislative and not judicial con-
trol. 2 JoNS, EVIDENCE § 508 (4th ed. 1938).
The requirement of a death certificate and its admissibility as
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein have been codified
in many states. Most of the statutes are similar to the one cited
in the principal case, making the death certificate only prima facie
evidence which is actually nothing more than a rebuttable pre-
sumption. Jones v. May, 310 Ky. 706, 221 S.W. 2d 617 (1949); Pru-
dential Ins. Co. v. Tuggle, 254 Ky. 814, 72 S.W. 2d 440 (1934).
One of the earliest cases dealing with the admissibility under
a statute of a death certificate over an objection that it was priv-
ileged was Bozicevich v. Kenilworth Mercantile Co., 58 Utah 458,
199 Pac. 406, 17 A.L.R. 346 (1921). There, the plaintiff's son al-
legedly died from eating impure ice cream manufactured by the
defendants. The question arose as to the admissibility of the death
certificate as evidence when introduced by defendant. The court
held it admissible, stating that since the physician-patient privi-
lege is purely statutory the legislature could and did change the
extent of the privilege so as to make the certificate admissible in
civil actions.
The courts admitting the death certificate as evidence over
the physician-patient privilege argue that the purpose of the privi-
leged communication statute was to protect confidential matters
growing out of the relationship of physician and patient. When
legislation requires physicians to file death certificates in a public
office and makes such certificates public records they are no longer
confidential, and consequently there is no reason to treat them as
being privileged. Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walters, 180 Miss.
384, 177 So. 47 (1937); McGinty v. Brotherhood of Railway Train-
men, 166 Wis. 83,164 N.W. 249 (1917). One case allows the physician
to explain the medical terms and the nature of the disease men-
tioned in the death certificate. Randolph v. Supreme Liberty Life
Insurance Co., 221 S.W. 2d 155 (1949), held that since the testimony
of the physician making the certificate could not be received in
evidence because of the privilege, it would be an inconsistency to
admit the death certificate. Key v. Cosmopolitan Life, Health &
Accident Insurance Co., 225 Mo. App. 925, 36 S.W. 2d 118 (1937);
contra, Polish Roman Catholic Union of America v. Palen, 302
Mich. 557, 5 N.W. 2d 463 (1942).
The general rule is then, that where death certificates are made
under statutory authority, and under such conditions that their
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accuracy in reciting facts contained therein is certain, they may
be allowed in evidence. Ranger, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, 196 F. 2d 968 (6th Cir. 1952).
Perhaps the best reason for allowing the death certificate to
be admitted in evidence is the fact that the physician-patient privi-
lege is supposed to protect the patient against undue publicity of
his personal affairs and since this publicity has already taken place,
the privilege can now serve only to hinder the course of justice.
Robert Hill
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LIAEILITY Or CHARITABLE HOSPITAL
A nurse, an employee of a charitable non-profit hospital, in-
jected a foreign substance into the arm of the plaintiff, a paying
patient, causing pain and permanent suffering. The plaintiff brought
an action against the hospital based on the alleged negligence of
the nurse; there was no allegation of negligence in selecting or re-
taining the nurse nor of administrative negligence such as failure
to furnish proper equipment. The trial court sustained a demurrer
to the complaint. On appeal the Supreme Court of Washington,
held, reversed. Charitable non-profit hospitals are liable for injury
to paying patient due to negligence of employees. Pierce v. Yakima
Valley Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
This decision reversed a series of cases from 1893 to 1943 holding no
liability in such cases.
There is a difference in some respects between the charitable
trust and the holding of property by a charitable corporation, but
it is not believed that there should be a distinction between the two
for tort liability. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 401 (1953). The basic issue in
the principal case is whether the law should exempt charities in
whole or in part from tort liability to beneficiaries, servants and
others on the ground that the public benefit inherent in a charity
justifies denying recompense for damage suffered by one indi-
vidual. The paradoxes of principle, fictional assumption of fact,
and confused results characterizing judicial disposition of this prob-
lem are vividly portrayed in Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130
F.2d 810 (D.C.Cir. 1942). Though courts have been unable to de-
cide this problem uniformly, legal scholars who have treated the
problem are harmonious in their criticisms of any rule granting im-
munity. PROSSER, TORTS 1079 (1941); I-IHAa, TORTS § 294 (1931);
ScOTT, TRUSTS § 402 (1939); BOGERT, TRUSTS § 401 (1953); 10 Am.
Jun., CH~rrTEs § 140.
The general rule that one is liable for tortious conduct and
that charity goes only to motive and not to duty was first departed
from in this country in 1876. McDonald v. Massachusetts General
Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876). The Massachusetts
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court held that a charity patient's claim for damages could not be
satisfied from private charitable funds. The authority for this
rule was dictum in two early English cases which did not deal with
tort liability of private charities and which were expressly over-
ruled (1866 and 1871) prior to being cited as authority for the
McDonald case.
The rationale of the trust fund theory is that if charitable
funds are used to satisfy judgments the fund will be diverted from
the intended use and thus the fund dissipated. 10 AM. JUR. CHAR-
rriEs § 145; ScoTT, TRusTs § 402 (1939). The logical result of this
theory would be immunity as to strangers, paying beneficiaries and
in cases of administrative negligence, yet some states supposedly
following this theory allow recovery in such cases. Cohen v. General
Hospital Society of Conn., 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931); Rob-
erts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318
(1925).
It is said that charities are immune from tort liability because
respondeat superior does not apply where the master receives no
gain from the services. Herans v. Waterbury Hosp. Ass'n., 66 Conn.
98, 33 AtL 595 (1895). This theory is criticized on principles of
agency in that liability should be predicated solely on control over
employees. Lichty Carbon County Agr. Ass'n., 31 F. Supp. 809
(M.D. Pa. 1940). Inconsistency also invades this doctrine. Foster
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230
(1950).
Immunity has also been rested on ground that governmental
immunity should apply to charities because they are performing
a quasi public function. University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127
Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907). Courts have generally balked at ex-
tending governmental immunity to privately conducted charities.
Cohen v. General Hospital Society of Conn., supra.
It is sometimes argued that a beneficiary by accepting benefits
waives liability, Winstow v. V.F.W. National Home, 328 Mich. 488,
44 N.W. 2d 19 (1950), or assumes the risk of negligence. Sisters of
Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930). These
doctrines based on an implied contract have been criticized as fic-
titious and as being untenable assumptions. 10 Am. Jur. CHArrms
§ 145; ScoTT, TRUSTS § 402 (1930); PROssER, ToRTs 1082 (1941).
Some cases indicate that these theories are only theoretical
justifications for what various courts feel is sound public policy.
Andrews v. Y.M.C.A., 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (1939). The
argument is that group rights should be placed before individual
rights which result cannot be attained if charity is subject to li-
ability. This theory is followed in many states but there is little
agreement as to the extent of immunity. This divergency should not
1954]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
exist if there is a real basis in fact for the rule. 25 A.L.R. 2d 29, 70
(1952). Some courts have recognized that public policy of today
may be opposite to that prevailing in earlier years. Haynes v. Pres-
byterian Hospital Ass'n., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151 (1950);
Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So.2d 142
(1951); Ray v. Tuscon Medical Center, 2 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220
(1951).
No general rule exists today. Eleven states give complete im-
munity. Gregory v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d
837 (1944). Fifteen states have partial immunity depending on the
victim's status or the nature of the negligence or both, such as
liability to servants, Melnerny v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n., 122 linm.
10, 141 N.W. 837 (1913); to strangers, Simmons v. Wiley Methodist
Episcopal Church, 112 N.J.L. 29, 170 Atl. 237 (1934); or liability for
negligence in selecting or retaining employees, Taylor v. Flower
Deaconess Home, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922); or for
breach of a statutory duty, McInerny v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra,
or when engaged in non-charitable activity, McKay v. Morgan Me-
morial Co-op, 272 Mass. 121, 172 N.E. 68 (1930); Lichty v. Carbon
County, Agr. Ass'n., supra; but maintain immunity for negligence of
subordinate employees to a beneficiary even though a paying pa-
tient, Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n., 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E.
1089 (1911). In three states immunity is limited to exempting trust
property from execution. Anderson v. Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171
S.W.2d 401 (1943). Sixteen states and the District of Columbia have
adopted or tend to adopt total liability. Ray v. Tucson Medical Cen-
ter, 72 Ariz. 22 230 P. 2d 220 (1951). Three states (Montana, New
Mexico, and South Dakota) have no reported cases in point. For a
collection of these authorities, see note, 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 142 (1952).
Washington *prior to the principal case followed a rule of
partial immunity holding there was no immunity as to employees,
strangers and invitees or to those whose injuries are due to ad-
ministrative negligence but there was immunity as to paying and
non-paying beneficiaries. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hos-
pital Ass'n., supra at 772. In Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99
Wash. 399, 169 Pac. 828 (1918), the court said sound public policy
favored immunity because individual hardship was offset by over-
all stimulation and encouragement given charity by immunity. In a
number of cases from 1893 to 1943 the court refused to reexamine
its limited immunity rule. However, a 1940 concurring opinion in-
dicated that the rule was an anachronism but that only the legis-
lature should change it. Yet in the principal case, following the
trend in other states, the court, in the light of present conditions
and thinking, reexamined the factors on which public policy was
based and found that if conditions ever justified immunity, they
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do not exist today. Because the court had promulgated the rule, the
court contended that it as well as the legislature could change or
reject it.
The Ohio rule parallels the former Washington rule; immunity
in Ohio is qualified and limited. Esposito v. Stambaugh Auditorium
Ass'n., 49 Ohio L. Abs. 507, 77 N.E.2d. 111 (1946). There is no im-
munity for tort as to a stranger and by the same reasoning the
rule would prevail as to servants of the charity. Cullen v. Schmit,
139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942); Sisters of Charity v.
Duvelius, supra. Charities are liable for negligence in the selection
and retention of employees, but otherwise are not liable for negli-
gence of employees to beneficiaries; moreover, it is immaterial that
the beneficiary is a paying patient. The basis for this limited im-
munity lies in considerations of public policy. Taylor v. Flower
Deaconess Home, supra. Except for dicta in Pearlstein v. A. M. Mc-
Gregor Home, 79 Ohio App. 526, 73 N.E.2d 106 (1947); the cases
support the rule that immunity is not lost because the tort is com-
mitted during non-charitable activities, such as operating a res-
taurant or selling religious articles for a profit. Cullen v. Schmit,
supra; Emrick v. Penn. R.R. Y.M.C.A., 69 Ohio App. 353, 43 N.E.2d
733 (1942). In other jurisdictions where this question has been con-
sidered as a distinct issue immunity has been withdrawn. Lichty
v. Carbon County Agr. Ass'n., supra. Whether immunity extends
to a breach of a statutory duty has not been adjudicated in the Ohio
Supreme Court and lower courts do not agree. In Howard v. Chil-
drens Hospital, 37 Ohio App. 144, 174 N.E. 166 (1930), immunity
was denied due to breach of a statutory duty but in another case
where the question was not directly considered immunity was sus-
tained. Esposito v. Stambaugh Auditorium Assn., supra. The fact
that the charity carries public liability insurance does not reflect on
liability. Emriclc v. Penn. R.R. Y.M.C.A., supra.
Due to changes in social and economic conditions, the emphasis
on individual rights, insurance coverage, increased size, govern-
mental support of charities, and the fact that charities have sur-
vived when subject to full liability, it can be convincingly argued
that Ohio should abandon its partial immunity rule. On the other
hand it can also be argued that to make charities fully liable would
make them susceptible to many unfounded claims. Inevitably all
patients do not recover. Negligence in such cases is hard to dis-
prove and true injuries even harder to determine, and in spite of
instructions as to burden of proof juries are ready to find for
claimants and assess heavy damages. Query whether these argu-
ments are sufficient reasons to deny bona fide claimants the right
to present their case to a jury. Precedent must be hurdled. How-
ever, the supreme court in 1922 recognized that the rule had its
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origin in public policy and that it would in the future be developed,
modified or extended as necessities of new social and economic
conditions demanded. Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home, supra.
The time has come for the rule to be abandoned. Conditions no
longer exist to justify the considerations on which the policy argu-
ment is based.
Donald W. Wiper, Jr.
WILLs - REVOCATION BY DIVORCE
Action by executor against testator's widow for a declaratory
judgment defining the widow's rights under the will. Testator and
widow were married in 1898. The will in question was executed
in 1937. In 1939 the widow obtained a divorce, the decree contain-
ing a fair and equitable division of property amicably arrived at
by the two parties. Testator died in 1951 without having revoked
the will of 1937. The executor contended that the divorce, with the
incidental property settlement, effected an implied revocation of
the will as to the widow, relying on Ohio Revised Code, § 2107.33,
which provides that "nothing herein contained shall prevent the
revocation implied by law, from subsequent changes in the con-
ditions and circumstances of the testator." The probate court held
that the will had been revoked by implication as to the widow. The
court of appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals, affirming the holding of the probate court.
Younker v. Johnson, 160 Ohio St. 409, 116 N.E. 2d 715 (1954).
On two previous occasions the Supreme Court of Ohio had
faced the problem of the effect of a divorce upon the testamentary
bequest of one spouse to the other. Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St.
298 (1875), held that the mere granting of a divorce to the husband
did not revoke his will leaving property to her. The court dis-
tinguished the Charlton case from the instant case in two respects:
(1) the will was executed prior to the marriage; and (2) there
was no incidental property settlement. A subsequent case held that
the granting of a divorce coupled with a property settlement did
not impliedly revoke the will. Codner v. Caldwelt, 156 Ohio St.
197, 101 N.E. 2d 901 (1951). The only meaningful distinction raised
by the court between the Codner case and the instant case is that
the will in the former case was executed before marriage, in the
latter during marriage. The court did not presume to overrule the
previous cases, but disposed of the instant case by distinguishing
it from its predecessors. Thus, the holding in the instant case can
be narrowly defined as follows: A divorce decree, coupled with a
property settlement, impliedly revokes the husband's will as to
his wife, if the will was executed during the marriage. Two prior
lower court decisions in Ohio are in exact accord. Pardee v. Grubiss,
[Vol. 15
RECENT DECISIONS
34 Ohio App. 474, 171 N.E. 375 (1929); Bornheim v. Roesch, 13
Ohio L. Abs. 180 (1932).
Only twelve states, including Ohio, give statutory recognition
to the doctrine of implied revocation. Durfee, Revocation of Wills
by Subsequent Change in the Conditions or Circumstances of the
Testator, 40 MhcH. L. REv. 406, 407 (1942). Litigation in these states
on facts paralleling those of the instant case has usually been similar-
ly resolved. Lansing v. Haynes, 95 MVich. 16, 54 N.W. 699 (1893);
Donaldson v. Hall, 106 MVinn. 502, 119 N.W. 219 (1909); In re Estate
of Bartlett, 108 Neb. 681, 190 N.W. 869 (1922); Will of Battis, 143
Wis. 234, 126 N.W. 9 (1910). See note, 18 A.L.R. 2d 697 (1951). This
result is said to be "in accord with reason and justice" in THOMSON,
WiLLs (3d Ed.) § 176. But on the other hand it has been argued
that the doctrine of implied revocation should not be extended to
cover this fact pattern. The dissent in the instant case felt that
the doctrine should be confined to its common law scope. The only
changes in domestic relations that revoked a will at common law
were the marriage of a man, followed by birth of issue, or the
mere marriage of a woman. Durfee, supra, at 406; 1 PAGE, WLLS
(Life-time Ed.) § 508. The danger of contravening the intent of
the testator is also raised as militating against the wisdom of im-
plying revocation under such circumstances. PAGE, supra, § 522. But
notwithstanding these persuasive arguments, Ohio's position clearly
meets with the concurrence of cogent authority.
The Ohio court was silent as to whether this particular fact
situation effects an irrebuttable revocation. Most courts that have
considered this point hold that it cannot be rebutted by evidence
of the testator's intent that the bequest remain effective. Will of
Battis, supra; In re McGraw's Estate, 233 Mich. 440, 207 N.W. 10
(1926); In re Martin's Estate, 109 Neb. 289, 190 N.W. 872 (1922).
Legal writers agree that the revocation is conclusive. PAGE, supra,
§ 522; RoLLwSoN, WIns § 153.
One question remains. Is the distinction between the facts
of Codner v. Caldwell, supra, and the instant case a vital one,
justifying a different result? In both cases there was a divorce with
an adjunctive property settlement. But in the Codner case the will
was executed before the marriage, in the instant case during mar-
riage. In commenting on this distinction, in reference to its sug-
gestion in Charlton v. Miller, supra, a legal writer called it "with-
out significance." Evans, Testamentary Revocation by Divorce, 24
Ky. L.J. 1, 2 (1935). The author was unable to discover any
other court which has given operative force to this factual nuance,
and is inclined to regard it as without foundation.
David G. Sherman
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